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1.  Introduction 
 
The rapid advancement of transportation and communication technologies has 
accelerated the globalization of the world economy, and has led to increase productivity 
and economic growth, and a higher standard of living in some countries.  However, 
globalization has brought many side-effects, such as illicit trade and fraudulent financial 
transactions and tax evasion through offshore financial centers and tax haven, and 
massive capital flight.    
This paper documents the typology, forms, scope, magnitudes, driver and impact of 
illicit trade in East Africa, with particular reference to Uganda. In addition to this paper, 
two other papers are available for Tanzania and Kenya, based on the findings from those 
two countries.  
Illicit trade refers to commercial transactions that are inconsistent with established 
national and international laws such as property rights, tax and customs law. It spans a 
spectrum of activities ranging from counterfeiting, to smuggling and under-declaration of 
goods at customs. These activities take the form of smuggling; counterfeiting of products; 
concealment of information – about the quantity, value and even the real name of the 
product. By definition, illicit trade is not included in official national statistics and the 
national income convention. According to staff at British American Tobacco (BAT) in 
Uganda, illicit products are goods whose duty has not been (fully) paid for in the market 
where it is being sold; these include smuggled products, duty free product beyond 
allowable limits and counterfeit products. And to officials of Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA), illicit trade is an outright smuggling, including goods in excess of allowable 
limits/quantity (duty free limits). Hence, illicit products are goods that have not been 
declared to customs at all. In this context, under-declaration of goods at customs is not 
considered to be an act of smuggling but is generally treated as a customs offence. 
However, smuggling and under-declaration of goods and customs seizures are such a 
small percentage of overall trade that is illegal.  
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Illicit trade is a serious concern in Sub-Saharan Africa as it has negative impact on 
capital scarce economies. There is loss of tax revenues for funding public expenditure on 
health, education and public infrastructure. In East Africa the most serious form of illicit 
trade activity is counterfeiting, seen at a scale analogous to the Peggy and Alan’s (1999) 
graphic description of “Walk down any main street in Shanghai, Paris or New York 
[Kampala, Kigali, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, or Bujumbura] and you will see evidence of 
the counterfeit goods trade.” The U.S. International Trade Commission (1984, p.vii) 
defines counterfeiting as "the unauthorized use of a registered trademark on a product 
that is identical or similar to the product for which the trademark is registered and used." 
Counterfeiting undermines the functioning of the property rights system. Not only do 
consumers suffer the direct harm associated with the purchase of low-quality copies 
purporting to be originals, but the infringement on the legitimate firms' rights alters the 
incentives to invest in their reputations.  
Illicit trade can have distorting effect of prices, with attendant consequences on 
competitiveness, employment and loss of revenues (as goods are sold below normal 
market prices) – thus source of disincentive to investment. In fact, this underground 
economy, if significant in magnitude, can make implementation of monetary and fiscal 
policies difficult. According to World Health Organization (WHO), substandard, 
spurious, falsely labelled, falsified and counterfeit medical products are by their very 
nature difficult to detect. They are often designed to appear identical to the genuine 
product and may not cause an obvious adverse reaction, however they often will fail to 
properly treat the disease or condition for which they were intended.  
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2.  The East Africa trade relations 
 
This section provides an overview of the EAC trade relations - exploring the trade 
relationship among the three EAC member states before and after the formation of the 
EAC and the effect of the integration process to cross border trade. It also highlights the 
roles of cross border trade to the economies of the member states, including issues such 
as damping, counterfeit and other trade practices that affect cross border trade.  
The performance of regional integration can be known from the share of intra-
regional trade to total trade. Increasing shares are associated with success, declining 
shares with failure. In EAC, however, official (recorded) intra-regional trade appears 
substantially lower than what actually takes place in the form of trade between its 
neighbours – notwithstanding the progress in this regards after the formation of the EAC. 
Since the mid-1990s through 2003, available records show improvement in export 
performance for EAC countries, stimulated by increased openness of their economies. 
However, measured in relation to country’s GDP, all the countries experienced decline in 
the export-to-GDP ratio (Table A1) - which shows the volume of exports has not 
expanded in proportion with economic growth in the EAC countries. The declines in 
export-to-GDP ratios for all the EAC countries are associated with inward-oriented 
strategies still applied by these countries, among other factors.  
However, both Kenya and Tanzania witnessed improvement in their trade balance in 
relation to GDP except Uganda; although Uganda’s imports/GDP (same as Tanzania) 
declined during this period. The difference is partly counted for by the differences in the 
real growth in GDP (which declined for the case of Uganda’s and increased for the case 
of Tanzania’s).  Both countries have also witnessed significant improvement in their 
current account balance on account of some increases in their exports.  
Increases in shares of bilateral trade (in total trade) between 1990 and 2003 (Table 
A1) are further indications of improved trade relations and increased trade flows between 
the EAC member states – though still unsatisfactory by the criteria mentioned above. 
Kenya is the net exporter in the EAC market and Tanzania is the net importer (Table 1).  
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Table 1 . EAC Countries: Bilateral trade flows (Averages, 1995-2000, and outcomes for 
2002) 
 Exports in % of country 1's total exports Imports in % of country 2's total imports 
  Country 2 Country 2 
Country 1 Kenya Tanzania Uganda Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
 
Uganda 
 
0.7/0.4 
 
1.0/1.8 
 
x 
 
0.1/0.1 
 
0.3/0.4 
 
x 
Tanzania 4.3/6.0 x 2.1/3.9 0.9/1.4 x 1.7/3.3 
Kenya x 8.5/4.4 16.6/18.2 x 10.1/6.8 38.2/45.6 
 
Source: IMF/IFS; and Direction of Trade (DOT), 2003 
 
While official statistics show ‘unsatisfactory’ performance of intra-regional trade to date, 
all agree that a substantial proportion of intra-regional trade in food items and 
merchandise takes place across the EAC borders that goes unrecorded. If regulated, this 
trade would form substantial intra-regional trade and a basis for economic integration in 
the region.  
 
2.2  The structure and patterns of EAC trade 
 
Overall, the EAC members have a similar trade pattern, with commodity exports focused 
on extra-EAC markets, especially the EU. An average of 3 to 10 percent of the exports of 
the EAC members have gone to African markets outside the EAC, and 31 to 82 percent 
to markets outside Africa. An average of 9 to 14 percent of the imports of members has 
been received from Africa outside EAC, while imports from the rest of the world ranged 
from 50 to 80 percent.  
Detailed results of intra – and extra – EAC trade are presented in Tables 2 and 3 and 
Figures 1–3. Table 2 shows overall improvements in intra-EAC exports performance 
since the 2005, most likely attributable to increased openness of the EAC economies. 
Across countries, Table 2 indicates that in 2000–2004, Uganda accounted for 5 percent of 
intra-EAC exports, and a huge 57.5 percent of intra-EAC imports. In 2005–2008, 
Uganda’s share of intra-EAC export rose substantially to 15.3 percent, while its share of 
intra-EAC imports declined to 44.4 percent. This means that Uganda’s trade performance 
improved since the launch of the EAC Customs Union in 2005. The same applies to 
Tanzania and Burundi.  
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For the case of Tanzania, its share of total intra-EAC exports rose from 8.56 percent 
in 2004–2004 (i.e. before the Customs Union) to 14 percent in 2005–2008 (after the 
Customs Union). Its share of total intra-EAC imports declined from 19.25 percent before 
the Customs Union to 14.8 percent after the Customs Union. 
 
 Table 2. Intra-EAC trade flows (percent) 
IMPORTING 
COUNTRIES 
EXPORTING COUNTRIES  
Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda TOTAL 
Trade flows 2000 - 2004 averages  
Burundi  2.70 0.12 2.71 0.71 6.25 
Kenya 0.01  0.02 2.49 1.58 4.10 
Rwanda 0.12 9.25  1.67 1.86 12.91 
Tanzania 0.02 18.17 0.04  1.02 19.25 
Uganda 0.01 55.69 0.12 1.68  59.49 
Total 0.15 85.81 0.31 8.56 5.18 100.00 
 Trade flows 2005 - 2008 averages  
Burundi  2.67 0.16 0.97 2.17 5.97 
Kenya 0.18  0.13 6.67 4.24 11.23 
Rwanda 0.46 11.40  3.35 8.33 23.53 
Tanzania 0.01 14.29 0.01  0.53 14.83 
Uganda 0.04 41.18 0.12 3.10  44.44 
Total 0.69 69.54 0.42 14.09 15.26 100.00 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
Burundi saw a slight decline in its share of intra-EAC imports from 6.3 percent in 2000–
2004 to 5.97 percent in 2005 – 2008 and a rise in its share of total intra-EAC exports 
from 0.15 percent in 2000–2004 to 0.7 percent in 2005–2008. Rwanda and Kenya’s 
export-import status worsened in 2005–2008. However, Kenya dominates intra-EAC 
trade, with exports and imports share of 86 percent and 4 percent, respectively in 2000–
2004 and intra-EAC exports and imports share of 70 percent and 11 percent, respectively 
in 2005–2008. Kenya’s dominance in intra-EAC trade is reflected in its huge trade 
surplus with all the EAC countries.  
Moreover, total imports from EAC, SADC and rest of COMESA to the EAC Partner 
States, collectively accounted for only 18 percent of total imports in the Partner States in 
2005 – 2008, a slight fall from 21 percent in 2000 – 2004 (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Imports from EAC, rest of COMESA and SADC as a share of total imports 
  Percentage of total imports from Percentage of total Imports from 
  EAC Rest of COMESA SADC 
TOTA
L 
EAC Rest of COMESA SADC TOTAL 
 (2000 – 2004  average) (2005  - 2008 average)  
Burundi 25.8 6.3 8.6 40.7 19.3 4.3 5.4 29.1 
Kenya 1.0 3.3 10.3 14.4 1.5 3.1 7.9 12.5 
Rwanda 29.4 2.2 5.9 37.5 38.7 3.4 6.6 48.7 
Tanzania 5.5 1.8 12.9 20.2 3.8 1.8 12.8 18.4 
Uganda 27.0 1.6 8.8 37.4 16.3 1.9 7.5 25.6 
Total 8.0 2.6 10.6 21.2 6.6 2.6 9.0 18.2 
Source: COMTRADE 
Note: Rest of COMESA excludes COMESA Member States that belong to EAC (i.e. Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda). SADC 
excludes imports from Tanzania    
 
2.2.2  Kenya’s Trade with the EAC 
We saw in Table 2 that Kenya dominates intra-EAC trade, with its exports accounting for 
as high as 86 percent of the total intra–EAC exports.  Yet, its imports from EAC 
countries accounts for only 4 percent of the total intra-EAC imports. As a result, Kenya 
runs a huge trade surplus with all the EAC countries. Kenya has a stronger manufacturing 
base than any of its EAC partners, resulting in a higher capacity to export to the region. 
Figure 1 shows that the European Union is Kenya’s leading destination market and that 
Kenya’s exports to the EAC and COMESA have been increasing but at a relatively 
slower pace than its exports to the EU especially after 2005. 
Figure 1. Kenya's exports to selected regional destinations 
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Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
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Kenya’s exports to EAC as a percent of its total exports declined from 23.4 percent in 
2005 to 16.6 percent in 2008.  Kenyan exports to COMESA followed similar trends.  The 
share of Kenyan exports to the EU increased slightly from 34.7 percent in 2005 to 35.6 in 
2008 (it was 43.6 percent in 1998, and 57.7 percent in 2004).   
In the EAC, Kenya’s merchandise exports are primarily oriented towards Uganda 
(followed by Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi). Its major extra-EAC destinations are the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands. Petroleum products dominate 
Kenya’s exports to the EAC, constituting an average of 39 percent of total exports to 
Uganda between 1998 and 2007, 18 percent of total exports to Tanzania, 52 percent to 
Rwanda, and 46 percent to Burundi during the same period. Other major Kenyan exports 
to the region include construction materials, particularly, cement and lime, as well as 
plastics articles, paper and paperboard, iron and steel products, medicaments, soap, 
cleansing and polishing products, vegetable fats and oils, footwear, and textile materials. 
Trends in Kenya’s merchandise imports from 2001 to 2008, presented in Figure 2 put 
European Union on top of all the regions that import into Kenya. One year after signing 
of the EPA Interim Agreement, imports from the EU increased dramatically. Under this 
agreement, Kenya with its EAC partners has agreed to gradually liberalise 80 percent of 
its trade for imports from EU covering mainly capital goods, raw material and 
intermediate / industrial goods over a period of 15 years (attaining full liberalization over 
a period of 25 years). Large proportion of Kenya’s imports comprise capital goods and 
intermediate/industrial goods, and manufactured products such as machinery, 
transportation equipment, motor vehicles, and petroleum products.  
Besides EU, a large bulk of imports comes from the United Arab Emirates, India, China, 
and Saudi Arabia. In the neighbourhood, clearly, the EAC region is not a significant 
source of Kenya’s imports (Figure 6). Imports from EAC accounted for 1.4 percent of the 
total imports in 2008.  
From an insignificant share of 0.35 percent of total imports in 1998 and 2001, imports 
from EAC countries have grown to 1.4 percent in 2008. In value terms, Kenya’s imports 
from EAC partners grew from US$ 13.874 million in 2001 to US$ 182.4 million in 2008. 
Imports from COMESA countries increased from 1.28 percent of total imports in 1998 to 
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3.5 percent in 2001, and 3.2 percent in 2008. Most of the imports originating from EAC 
actually come from Tanzania, followed by Uganda, with minute amounts from Rwanda 
and Burundi (accounting for only about 0.03 to 0.04 percent of total Kenyan imports 
respectively).  
  Kenya’s major imports from the EAC partners include textile materials, wood, maize, 
paper and paperboard, cotton, cereals, medicines, vegetables, and unprocessed hides and 
skins. The imports from Tanzania and Uganda are mainly unprocessed agricultural 
products. 
 
 
Figure 2. Trends in Kenya imports from selected regions 
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Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
  
 
2.2.3  Tanzania’s trade with the EAC  
Tanzania is a member of several regional initiatives, including the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Indian Ocean 
Rims-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), and Economic Partnership 
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Agreement with the EU.1 In parallel, Tanzania has signed 11 bilateral trade agreements. 
None of these serves Tanzania’s exports interest better than the agreement with the EU.   
The EU is Tanzania’s main destination market (Figure 3). In recent years, exports to 
EU have dropped to the levels of 2000–2002, partly due to fall in fish exports, but EU 
still remains the most important destination for goods from Tanzania.2 Since the Lomé 
Convention/Cotonou (now EPA era), most of Tanzanian exports to the EU are exempt 
from import duties. In addition, Tanzania's goods enjoy non-reciprocal preferential access 
to the EU markets under Everything-But-Arm (EBA) initiative extended to LDCs in the 
ACP. Tanzania’s other main trading partners are United Arab Emirate, Switzerland, 
Japan, India, Kenya, South Africa and Malawi.  
 
Figure 3. Tanzania’s exports trends in selected regional markets   
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Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
 
Tanzania exports primarily agricultural products — mainly cotton, coffee, tobacco, tea, 
cashew nuts, and cloves. South Africa is Tanzania’s largest trading partner in SADC, and 
the two countries have signed a memorandum of understanding on trade and industry 
programmes and a general agreement on economic, scientific, technical and cultural 
                                                 
1 On November 23, 2007, Tanzania, along with other EAC Partners States, initiated an interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union; and is currently negotiating a full EPA. 
2 Tanzania has a long history of exporting fish to the EU market. In 2005, fish export to the EU dropped by 
about a third the value of the previous years (COMTRADE) and since then hasn’t picked up well. Some 
have attributed this to stiffening competition from Vietnam that also exports fish to EU market and 
declining number of fish (Nile perch) catch in Lake Victoria.  
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cooperation (as we saw in Table 6). In 2008, Tanzania’s exports to South Africa 
amounted to US$73.1 million, from US$3.5 million in 2000. About a third (26.5 percent) 
of Tanzania’s exports in 2008 went to South Africa, and about 10 percent of Tanzania’s 
imports came from South Africa in the same year.  
Though it stopped being a member of COMESA, Tanzania still exports more to 
COMESA than it does to SADC, where it currently belongs. In Figure 7, we see that 
Tanzania’s exports to COMESA have grown faster than its exports to EAC or SADC in 
recent years — hence strong economic links with COMESA countries. While exports to 
SADC as a share of total exports increase by 0.6 percentage point between 2005 and 
2008 (i.e. from 9% in 2005 to 9.6% in 2008), the shares of exports to COMESA 
increased by about 2 percentage point during the same period (from 13.3% to 15%). 
Exports to EAC as share of total exports increase from 6.3 percent in 2005 to 8 percent in 
2008, which could have been attributed to reduction/elimination of intra-EAC tariffs 
upon introduction of the EAC Customs Union.  
On the imports front, the EU is the largest importer into Tanzania (Figure 4). EU 
imports into Tanzania amounted to US$1.04 billion in 2007 (accounting for 17.6 percent 
of Tanzania’s total imports that year). Other major sources of Tanzania’s imports are 
South Africa (SADC), and United Arab Emirates. 
 
Figure 4. Tanzania’s import trends from selected regions, 2001–2008   
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Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
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The EAC region is not a very significant source of Tanzania’s imports, accounting for 
about 2 percent of the total imports in 2007. 
 
2.2.4  Uganda’s trade with the EAC 
Uganda is a member of the EAC, COMESA, and the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD). Uganda initialed an interim Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) with the European Union in 2007; and benefits from the EU’s “Everything But 
Arms” initiative for the least developed countries (LDCs). Uganda also benefits from 
trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes with a 
number of developed countries, espcially the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) of the United States. However, the preferential trade agreements with the EU 
will continue to be the most important one for Uganda, for many more years to come. 
As Figure 9 shows, the EU is Uganda’s largest destination market, accounting for 
over 40 percent of Uganda’s merchandise exports. Although between 2005 and 2008, 
Uganda’s exports to EU experienced a 10 percentage point decline in total merchandise 
exports (i.e. from 37 percent of total exports in 2005 to 26.9 percent in 2008), in value 
terms, Uganda’s exports to the EU rose by 55 percent during the same period.  
 
Figure 5. Selected destinations of Uganda's exports  
EAC
COMESA
SADC
EU
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
v
a
lu
e
,'
0
0
0
 U
S
D
  
  
Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
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At the regional level, the EAC and COMESA countries are Uganda’s most important 
trading partners. Exports to the EAC market rose dramatically between 2006 and 2008. 
This can be attributed to the launching of the EAC Customs Union. The EAC now 
accounts for 20 percent Uganda’s merchandise exports.  
Outside EAC and COMESA, SADC countries are not very significant importers of 
Uganda’s goods. COMESA (excluding EAC countries) accounts for about 6 percent of 
Uganda’s merchandise exports in 2008, while exports to SADC-only countries, that is, 
countries in the region that are neither members of COMESA nor EAC, such as South 
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo, amounted to 2.6 percent of total exports in 
2008.  
From trade flows, while Uganda’s trade link with COMESA is strong, Uganda’s 
major trading partners in COMESA, outside EAC borders  (i.e. countries in COMESA, 
but not members of EAC ) are very few in numbers. The only noticeable one is Sudan, 
which accounted for about 1 percent of Uganda’s total exports in 2008. However, there is 
evidence of large volume of trade especially, agricultural food communities from Uganda 
to Sudan that go unrecorded. If such trade is taken into account, Sudan could account for 
over 2 percent of Uganda’s exports in 2008, and perhaps much higher in 2009 (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics and Bank of Uganda, 2008).3     
Export to COMESA and SADC as share of total exports increased by 2.2 percentage 
points (from 10.6% to 12.8%) and 0.7 percentage point (from 1.3% to 2%) respectively, 
leaving room for further expansion in exports to EAC. Uganda’s exports to EAC as a 
share of total imports rose from 8 percent in 2005 to 13.8 percent in 2008 (5.8 percentage 
point rise). This rise was also met my fall in share of exports to Asia from 7.5 percent in 
2005 to slightly below 6 percent in 2008. This means that with the coming of the EAC 
Customs Union, Uganda is increasingly exporting more and more merchandise to the 
EAC than to any single regional market in Africa. Agricultural products constitute more 
than half of Uganda’s merchandise exports (especially coffee, tobacco, cotton, and cut 
flowers).   
                                                 
3 Uganda Bureau of Statistics and Bank of Uganda conducted informal cross-border trade survey in 2007 
which established that Uganda’s informal agricultural exports to Sudan amounted to US$ 57.1 million that 
year, equivalent to about 3 percent Uganda’s total exports the same year.  
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Since 2006, the EU has dominated Uganda’s imports, overtaking imports from EAC 
and COMESA (Figure 6). Imports from EU as a share of total imports increased from 
18.8 percent in 2005 to 19.3 percent in 2008. 
 
Figure 6. Trends in Ugandan imports from selected regions 
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Source: Based on COMTRADE database 
  
Uganda’s imports from EAC as share of total imports declined substantially from 26.8 
percent in 2005 to 12.6 percent in 2008, also reflected in a drop in share of imports 
originating from COMESA (from 27 percent to 13 percent). Share of imports from 
SADC dropped slightly by 1 percentage point (i.e. 9.8 percent in 2005 to 8.8 percent in 
2008). In recent years, SADC imports into Uganda have grown faster than Uganda’s 
imports from EAC or COMESA. South Africa is Uganda’s main trading partner in 
SADC. The two countries signed a bilateral trade agreement in 2002 (as we saw in 
previous chapter, Table 2).  
 
2.2.5  Burundi’s trade with the EAC 
Burundi is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (since July 2007), the Economic Community 
for Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)4, and the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS). On November 23, 2007, Burundi, together with the other EAC Partners 
                                                 
4 Other members of CEPGL are Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
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States, initialed an interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European 
Union; and is currently negotiating a comprehensive EPA. At the same time, Burundi 
enjoys preferential market access under the EU’s “Everything but Arms” initiative for 
least developed countries. In addition, Burundi’s exports still enjoy preferential access to 
the U.S. market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
However, the utilization rate of US and EU preferences has been rather modest and 
their value negligible, compared to other countries in the region. It is constrained by 
limited supply capacity – being a country emerging from decades of conflict. 
Nevertheless, the European Union is still one of Burundi’s most important destination 
market (Figure 7), accounting for 40.6 percent of Burundi’s exports in 2008. In recent 
years, United Arab Emirates has been the most significant importer of goods from 
Burundi, accounting for 43 percent of Burundi’s total exports in 2008. 
Until recently, the EAC as a region has not been an important destination for goods 
from Burundi. In 2004 for example, only 0.5 percent of Burundi’s exports went to EAC, 
but in 2008 this ratio rose to 5.8 percent. The EAC significance is being felt after Burundi 
joined the Community in 2007 with increase in exports to EAC, comprising mainly beer, 
cigarettes, sugar, and cotton fabric; and raw hides, ornamental fish, live plants, fruits, 
flour, and vegetables.  
   
Figure 7. Selected destinations of Burundi's merchandise exports  
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Source: COMTRADE database  
Notes: Burundi relies primarily on coffee and tea for exports.    
  
 16 
With regards to imports, the EU is the largest importer into Burundi (Figure 8). After 
2006 imports from the EAC rose sharply (corresponding to the period of joining the 
EAC) but only faced a slight decline in 2008.  
 
Figure 8. Trends in imports into Burundi from selected trade partners 
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Source: COMTRADE database 
 
Petroleum products (fuels), rolling stock and machinery, inputs (construction materials, 
metallurgical products, agricultural inputs), pharmaceutical products, and foodstuffs 
dominate Burundi’s merchandise imports. 
 
2.2.6  Rwanda’s trade with the EAC 
Since 2004, Rwanda has implemented a 100 percent tariff reduction on imports from the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), of which it is a member.  
This measure is now superseded by its joining the East African Community (EAC) in 
2007 and the gradual adoption of EAC Common External Tariff (CET) for trade with the 
rest of the world. However, Rwanda commodity exports remain largely focused on extra-
EAC markets, especially the EU (Figure 9). Rwanda enjoys a preferential market access 
to the EU under the EU’s “Everything But Arms” initiative for the LDCs. 
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Figure 9. Selected destinations of Rwanda's merchandise exports  
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Source of data: COMTRADE 
Notes: Rwanda’s exports of primary commodities are largely dominated in value terms by coffee and tea.   
 
In 2008, Rwandan merchandise exports to the EU accounted for 23 percent of Rwanda’s 
total exports that year, while its exports to EAC accounted for only 2.7 percent. However, 
when trade volumes are considered, Rwanda exports to EAC markets actually grew 
faster, compared to its exports elsewhere (by about 50 percent between 2006 and 2008 
compared to the 7 percent exports growth gained in the EU markets during the same 
period). Though it is too early to judge (based on current results), the results nevertheless 
shows that Rwanda is increasingly making use of the EAC markets since it joined the 
Community in 2007 – which could see its share of intra-EAC exports increase 
substantially in the next two to five years.   
In addition to being a member of COMESA and the EAC, Rwanda is also a member 
of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic 
Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).  Its application is also pending 
to join the SADC. Rwand’s exports to SADC market has more than tripled between 2005 
and 2008 although its share of total exports still appears insignificant. Although Rwanda 
has been a beneficiary of the trade preferences under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) schemes, particulary the U.S’ African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) - since 2000, some sources have indicated that Rwanda has not been able to 
untilise it, and its exports to U.S. has remained insignificant (1 percent of its exports in 
2008).  
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When it comes to imports, Rwanda shows a strong reliance on imports from EAC 
(Figure 10). In Table 4, we saw that the EAC accounted for 39 percent of Rwand’s total 
imports in 2005 – 2008, compared with Kenya’s (1.5%) and Tanzania’s (3.8%) share of 
total imports in 2005–2008 coming from EAC countries. In Table 3, we also saw that 
most of Rwanda’s imports are from Kenya (11.4% of total intra-EAC imports in 2005–
2008), followed by Uganda (8.3%), Tanzania (3.4%), and Burundi (0.5%), while its 
largest regional destination market is Burundi, followed by Kenya, and Uganda.  
The EU is still a signficant importer into Rwanda (surpassing the SADC region and 
China, for example), and its imports into Rwanda grown quite fast in recent years (Figure 
10) - signifying an increasing economic ties Rwanda. In November 2007, Rwanda 
initialed an interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU.  
  
Figure 10. Trends in Rwandan imports from selected regions 
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3.  Regional growth of illicit trade  
 
3.1  Introduction 
The global trade in counterfeit goods is growing at an alarming rate. Africa is 
increasingly being targeted as a destination for counterfeit goods according to the World 
Customs Organization’s Counterfeiting and Piracy Unit.  
 
Cross-border trade activities, depending on the way they conducted can be both 
beneficial and harmful to the economy. In many instances, they help to create 
employment (formal and informal) especially for the local population close to the borders 
areas. The increased presence of traders and movement of people and goods across-
border has certainly created more demand for goods and services hence employment e.g. 
in hotels, lodges and restaurants, shops, money changing, etc. In a formal or law abiding 
situation (where official procedures are followed by operators) the economy gains 
through tax revenue. However, where illegal or illicit means are used cross-border trade 
can be detrimental to the economy.  
 
3.2  Counterfeit trade 
 
Dumping and counterfeits   
The practice of offering products for sale abroad at prices lower than the nominal value 
(defined as the price charged by a firm in the home market) is known as dumping. 
Together with the provision of subsidies to domestic enterprises, dumping is considered 
to be an unfair trade practice, against which the WTO provides rules and remedies. 
Dumping is a serious problem in Uganda. Most dumped products are smuggled into the 
country through customs but declared as agricultural inputs, used clothes or any products 
that attract minimum taxes.  
Dealings in counterfeit products are also very rampart in Uganda. A recent article in 
Uganda’s local newspaper defines counterfeiting as “unauthorised use, on the same 
goods, of a trademark identical to a registered mark with the purpose of deceiving or 
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defrauding unsuspecting buyers. It is also an imitation to pass the faked goods for an 
original or genuine (product)”. Experiences of manufacturing firms in Kampala clearly 
show that the magnitude of the problem in Uganda cannot be underestimated. 
 In 2004, about 50 tonnes of counterfeit goods were impounded by the Uganda 
National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) because they failed to meet the minimum quality 
standards. These included foodstuffs, soft drinks, salt, cosmetics, clothes, building 
materials such as cement, and factory goods. According to officials at UNBS, counterfeit 
goods worth over Shs 600 million were either denied market in Uganda (returned) or 
destroyed by inspection units at various border points. Other affected products are pens 
(e.g. the case between Mulwana and Picfare), tiger head battery, textiles, and foam 
products (e.g. the case between Euro foam and Vita Foam), tooth brush (case between 
Mulwana ship toothbrush and another firm that produced the same from a German 
factory). In Uganda, it is believed that all the tiger head batteries being sold are 
counterfeit batteries. These are smuggled into the country (mainly from Taiwan through 
the Kenyan border) – though their importation was banned by government.    
Cigarettes were also mentioned among the counterfeit products - describing the 
problem as perhaps more serious than batteries. Those interviewed in (in government and 
private sector) suspected tobacco agents in counterfeit deals. They seem to be equating 
counterfeiting to the similarities in the cigarettes package, colour on the stick, and aroma 
with those produced by BAT Uganda. They may also be thinking this way because of the 
past newspaper articles e.g. the legal battles between some tobacco companies. Certain 
sources claimed that Supermatch cigarettes in Ugandan market with ‘made in Uganda’ 
label could be coming from Kenya, only packed in Uganda. It is perceived that the 
packaging materials may be made in Kenya but the cigarettes are packed in Uganda. 
According to Uganda Manufacturers Association, URA, BAT Uganda, and Uganda 
business operators, counterfeit activities are very difficult to eliminate. It is difficult 
because it is a global phenomenon; and it is a complicated issue in the legal sense. 
Besides, it is expensive to register everything about a product – colour and appearance 
including special features and designs on packaging materials, aroma, etc. The law says 
that it is upon the company whose trademark is infringed on to forward their complaints 
to the Registrar of Trademarks for appropriate action. 
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Moreover, Uganda, like many countries in the developing world lacks advanced 
equipment to detect counterfeited products and expertise to track down and stop 
counterfeiting schemes. The main sources of counterfeit products are Thailand, India, 
Korea, Taiwan, and most of the counterfeit products are absorbed in Africa markets 
because of inability to detect them.  
Often, counterfeit products are discovered when they are already in shops. 
According to the opinion we gathered (and we think correctly so), efforts should be 
directed at strengthening the machinery for inspection of goods that enter the country. In 
Uganda, it is only the Bureau of Standards and Uganda Revenue Authority (Customs) 
that are legally mandated to inspect goods entering the country. But because of 
sophistication associated with differentiating between goods that are counterfeit and 
goods that are genuine, most counterfeited goods pass undetected.   
Uganda Bureau of Standards uses mainly the quality criteria, but as one informer 
said, not all counterfeit products are inferior in quality; some are even of higher quality. 
The counterfeited tooth brush produced in Germany (purported to be products from 
Mulwana’s factory in industrial area) which happened to be of superior quality is a good 
example – where quality criteria may not work all the time. In other words, quality 
criteria alone are inadequate.  
Those talked to think that the customs is the weakest point in the link supposed to 
inspect the goods. They said that individuals at the customs who are supposed to play the 
biggest role in preventing counterfeits goods entering the country seem to succumb to 
bribes.   
Otherwise, counterfeit practices are very damaging to the economy in terms of loss 
tax revenue. It distorts prices, and destabilises the market by substituting for products 
produced domestically and giving wrong signals to producers. A fall in domestic 
production can lead to loss of jobs and shortage in supplies in the long run and of course 
rising prices – absorbed by consumers. Quality of products is frequently compromised in 
counterfeit practices as they tend to employ ad hoc means or cheap systems on goods, 
often produced in a hurry, ‘undercover’.   
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4  The supply of illicit trade: Countries of origin 
 
 
In Uganda the most serious form of illicit trade activities is smuggling. A large part of 
this trade comprises day-to-day transactions between traders living in locations on either 
side of the national borders. Most commodities crossing borders are absorbed by the local 
markets along the border – usually delivered on bicycles and heads, and hands in 
‘caveras’ (polythane bags) normally in small quantities. Identifying cross-border illicit 
traders of this nature is not so straightforward because they could easily be mistaken for 
goods for own personal use or gift from relatives. Besides, the region’s borders are 
inherited from a colonial era that split entire communities who shared historical trading, 
family and cultural links, which makes these small-scale types of transactions to attract less 
attention. 
However, greater part of smuggling takes place in a well organised manner 
involving, in some cases, individuals working in a network. As such it is increasingly 
becoming more sophisticated. These are mainly associated with large transactions. Even 
small smugglers are upgrading slowly into handling huge consignments especially where 
they act as agents and commodity assemblers for big traders, who use them to avoid 
delays and costs associated with passing through the official border posts or customs. The 
opinion obtained in Uganda suggests that since small traders operate without many cost 
hassles associated with customs clearance, it is generally convenient and less expensive 
for traders to buy from them than to pass with large consignments through the customs.  
Transactions involving agricultural commodities are aided by brokers found on both 
sides of the border. These individuals generally have the most current information and 
networks on commodity supplies and prices across the borders. For a more timely and 
successful transaction traders often use them (brokers) and pay them commission for 
soliciting for clients. For instance, Kenyan traders interested in agricultural commodities 
contract Kenyan brokers who then link up with their Ugandan counters - contracted by 
stockists - to initiate a transaction.  
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4.2  Causes of illicit trade 
Differences in fiscal and trade policies were usually used by informants to explain 
the tremendous and perhaps unprecedented illicit trade in the EAC region. Another factor 
that has been used to explain illicit trade relates to colonial partitioning of the EAC into 
the countries – essentially historical factor. For example, it is argued that the creation of 
the borders was not based on any clear socio-cultural factors; rather it was arbitrary. As 
such, relatives were divided by borders and attached to different countries. These 
divisions disregarded the families so affected, who continued unabated with the social, 
cultural, and economic ties that existed prior to the creation of the borders.   
Many think that this type of trade is continued not to circumvent official markets. 
Rather it is attributed to family links, ignorance and insufficient level of civic awareness, 
among other factors.   
However, there is substantial evidence that illicit trade is on the increase. And the 
explanation given for its increasing magnitude and structure is the lack of harmony in 
policy. It has generally been acknowledged that differences in levels of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers have inhibited growth of formal trade within EAC region. Recent initiatives 
aimed at liberalizing intra-regional trade, while progressive, remain constrained by 
institutional and administrative bottlenecks, misalignment in policies of the EAC member 
countries, restrictive border transit procedures, weak infrastructure and bureaucratic 
customs delays and tax differential.  
Price disparity for identical products due to differences in taxes is one of the major 
incentives for this type of trade. A good example is tobacco products. Table 4 shows the 
wide disparity in the excise rates on the three brands of cigarettes in the three countries.  
 
Table 4.Excise rate on cigarettes in East Africa 
Brand 
Excise rate  in US$ 
Uganda 
Excise rate in US$ 
Kenya Excise rate in US$ Tanzania 
 Per 1000 Per pack Per 1000 Per pack Per 1000 Per pack 
B & H 27.4 0.60 18.7 0.4 15.5 0.3 
Sportsman 14.3 0.30 12.0 0.2 8.5 0.2 
Safari 10.9 0.20 6.0 0.1 - -- 
 
Source:  BAT Uganda   
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In countries where excise rates are high, prices also tend to be high as is clearly 
demonstrated in Table 2; which shows that tax is the main driver of prices. For example, 
the rate of excise on the four brands of cigarettes: B&H, Embassy, Sportsman and Safari 
are apparently higher in Uganda compared to Kenya or Tanzania (Table 4). 
Consequently, prices of cigarettes are higher in Uganda than any of these countries 
(Table 5).   
Table 5. Cigarettes prices in East Africa 
Brand 
Price per pack in US$ 
Uganda 
Price per pack in US$ 
Kenya 
Price per pack in US$ 
Tanzania   
B & H 1.71 1.33 1.18 
Embassy 1.43 1.07 0.73 
Sportsman 1.14 0.80 0.63 
Safari 0.57 0.51 - 
 
Source:  BAT Uganda   
Notes:  Exchange rate: US$ 1= UShs 1,750 (Uganda), KShs 75 (Kenya), TShs 1,099 (Tanzania) 
  
It appears financially lucrative to smuggle cigarettes from Kenya, even Tanzania 
into Uganda. Available information indicated that Kenya is the main source of smuggled 
cigarettes sold in Uganda.     
Different system of taxation adopted by the EAC countries certainly affects the 
prices. Uganda levies ad valorem rates of 130 percent on cigarettes. Instead, Kenya 
imposes specific rates based on average retail price bands. Kenya levies taxes essentially 
on ex-factory price while Uganda includes overheads.  
Another good example where smuggling has thrived because of tax disparity is 
gasoline. The specific excise duty rate for gasoline in Uganda is twice as high as that in 
Kenya or Tanzania (Table 6), which makes fuel cheaper in Kenya and Tanzania, even in 
Rwanda, than in Uganda. As a result Uganda is the main destination of smuggled fuel in 
the EAC region.  
 Table 6. Excise duty for petroleum products in EAC countries (per 1000 liters) in 2003/04 
 Uganda  Kenya  Tanzania  Rwanda 
Gasoline USh US$ KSh US$ TSh US$ Rate (%) 
  Premium 660,000 365 19,445 253 146,000 140 37 
  Regular 660,000 365 19,055 247 135,000 129 37 
Diesel 410,000 227 10,005 130 127,000 122 37 
Kerosene 200,000 111 5,755 75 122,000 117 37 
  
Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda); Ministry of Finance and Kenya Revenue Authority; Tanzania 
Revenue Authority and Ministry of Finance (Kenya), Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Republic of Rwanda (adopted from Ayoki 
et al 2005) 
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Though it is sometimes argued that high prices of gasoline in Uganda are due to 
high transportation costs to deliver gasoline to Uganda, we find this not convincing 
because how comes that Rwanda’s fuel that passes through Uganda is cheaper in Rwanda 
than in Uganda.    
Beverages are another category of products where tax regime differs across the 
EAC countries (Table 4). Uganda imposes ad valorem rates on beer while Kenya and 
Tanzania levy specific rates. In addition, Uganda has low rate for local beer while 
Tanzania excise all beers at the same rate. Wine and spirits are charged ad valorem rates 
in Kenya and Uganda, but specific rate in Tanzania. Also, unlike Kenya and Tanzania, 
Uganda levies a special excise duty or surcharges on a number of imported goods. 
Likewise, these have made border prices to vary on these products – creating incentives 
for smuggling – mainly into the Ugandan market.  
 Table 7. Excise duty rates on alcoholic beverages and soft drinks in EAC countries in 2003/04 
 Uganda Kenya Tanzania Rwanda 
Alcoholic beverages  USh/liter Brand KSh/liter  TSh/liter Rate (%) 
Beer   60 Stout/porter 49 All beer 232  
    20 (local) Malt 38   57 
     Non malt 24      
Wine     1/   70%  45%   *367= 70 
Spirits   70%   65%   1,102= 70 
soft drinks            
Mineral water   10%   10%   37.5= 39 
Sodas   13%   20%   .na. 39 
Cider   70%   35%   .na.  
  
Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda); Ministry of Finance and Kenya Revenue Authority; Tanzania 
Revenue Authority and Ministry of Finance (Kenya), Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Republic of Rwanda; and Ministry of 
Revenue, Government of Ethiopia (adopted from Ayoki et al 2005) 
Notes:   1/    TSh 743  if domestic grape content is less than 75 percent 
 
 
These simple examples can actually confirm that smuggling activities, which is 
large in magnitude (see next section), arises as more of a reaction to misalignment in the 
macroeconomic policies especially tax regimes. Policy harmonization and effective 
implementation of the trade liberalization scheme of the EAC would at least minimize 
this form of illicit trade. 
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4.3  Magnitude of illicit trade 
 
This section makes the observation that there is a substantial amount of trade between 
neighbours that goes unrecorded, a lot of it in small scale using several methods of 
transportation, including bicycles. The bulk of this trade takes place in and around 
established townships and customs posts along the borders. Here we have attempted to 
examine the extent to which illicit trade is practiced in Uganda (and Kenya). It should, 
however, be noted that, the fact that illicit trade is considered an illegal or ‘underground’ 
activity – conveyed through unofficial channels, or ‘under the table’ makes estimations of 
its magnitude, direction, conformity to relative comparative advantages and effects on the 
country revenue base, price of the affected sectors and employment, particularly difficult to 
make.   
 
Illicit trade between Uganda and Kenya is certainly thriving as available evidence 
shows. Uganda is the main source of smuggled agricultural commodities: the commonly 
traded commodities include maize, beans, bananas and fish; while Kenya is the main 
source of smuggled industrial products to Uganda. Ayoki et al (2008) reports high rate of 
cross-border smuggling of petroleum products, cigarettes, sugar, steel and leather 
products, textiles, bicycles, and chemicals into Uganda markets, from Kenya. Much of 
the petroleum products and cigarettes are smuggled across Lake Victoria. In certain 
instances, part of the smuggled cigarettes are offloaded in Kampala under the pretext that 
consignments are export goods and then transported to the DR of Congo or sold in Kihihi 
and Rukungiri, Ntungamo, Mbarara, Ishaka and Kasese.  
 
The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) estimated that 20 percent of the cigarettes 
on the Ugandan market are smuggled (URA, 2004, and personal communication). BAT 
estimates this at 15 percent – that is about 1.8 billion sticks of cigarettes per annum - 
equivalent to annual loss of about UShs 2 billion in tax revenue from one product 
(cigarettes) alone.  
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There were several indications that manufactured products entering Uganda are 
sometimes declared at customs as raw materials or agricultural inputs when they are 
actually finished products. For example:  
 
In February 2004 an agro company in Kampala imported 4,400 tons of Tiger Head Batteries 
worth US$87,296. The goods were declared as hoes and pangas (agricultural implements are tax 
exempted in Uganda). The goods were detected at the railways goods shade in Kampala… (Ayoki 
et al 2005).   
Under-declaration and false declarations are said to be common. At times, goods 
are allowed to enter the country without any documentation or with documents which 
indicate an intension to cross the country in transit (e.g. destined for Kigali in Rwanda or 
Kinshasa in the Democratic of Congo), although the goods end up being sold in Kampala 
or other major towns in Uganda. From some of the examples provided by URA and BAT 
Uganda, big consignments of cigarettes would reach designated market mainly DR 
Congo at different times but get re-routed (in same quantities) back into Ugandan market. 
While statistics on magnitude of illicit trade is hardly available, besides several 
cases that that have appeared in local newspapers of impounded goods – mainly 
cigarettes, recent surveys have established that illicit trade occurs in bigger magnitudes 
than had previously been assumed, and is also inexorably linked to the trade and tax 
policies of Uganda and Kenya and their neighbours. 
For example, the Regional Trade Analytical Agenda (RTAA) conducted a series of 
surveys on informal (illicit) cross-border trade between selected Eastern and Southern 
African countries between 1994 and 1998. The survey monitored all major agricultural and 
industrial commodities that crossed the border during the two randomly selected weeks 
each month, and estimated the total annual illicit cross border trade between Kenya and 
Uganda at about $ 140 million, 63 percent of which was in agricultural products. This 
figure is equivalent to about 2 percent of Kenya’s 1994 gross domestic product and close to 
60 percent of the value of formal trade between the two countries. 
Kenya had an illicit (informal) trade surplus of $22 million, with exports to and 
imports from Uganda of $81 million and $59 million respectively. About 42 percent of 
Kenya’s illicit exports were of agricultural origin, mostly sugar, wheat flour and bread. 
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Sugar was Kenya’s most valuable illicit export, worth about $20 million, while her most 
important illicit imports were fish, maize and beans (mostly from Uganda).  
Another survey was conducted between October 2003 and January 2004 by the 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics, covering two weeks in each month of border monitoring that 
lasted 4 months. The survey estimated total informal cross border trade between Kenya and 
Uganda during those 4 months at US$ 5.4 million. The total estimated value of illicit trade 
between Uganda and her neighbours during the review period was about US$ 8million, 
although this may actually represent less than 30 percent of the true value of illicit trade. If 
night-time cross-border trade and trade that was not captured by the monitoring (at non-
sample sites, for instance) is included, the total informal trade would be closer to $40 
million over the same period.   
Uganda’s most important trade trading partner in all these surveys was Kenya. And 
when the trade flows across Uganda-Kenya borders were considered, Uganda was found to 
have an illicit trade surplus – with total illicit exports valued at $ 4.7 million and imports of 
$0.7 million during the same period. Secondly, Uganda was found to be the net food 
exporter to all the neighbouring five countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, DRC, and 
Sudan), Kenya being the largest importer of food from Uganda (with a net balance 
estimated at about $3.5 million) – with food import comprising about 53 percent of all 
exports.  
The study further revealed that 44 percent of total expenditure on Uganda industrial 
imports comprised commodities from Kenya compared to about 17 percent of total foreign 
exchange earnings receipts accrued form exports of these products to Kenya. However, 
Uganda earned more foreign exchange from exports of industrial products to Tanzania than 
Tanzanian’s foreign exchange earning with its exports dealing in these products with 
Uganda. 
The leading industrial commodities that were traded across the border include second 
hand shoes (comprising 7.5% of industrial products to Uganda), Botique (Bitenge) with a 
share of 6.7 percent of industrial exports, second hand or used clothes (6%) and cement 
(3%). The commonly traded agricultural commodities included maize, beans, other grains, 
bananas and fish. Foreign exchange earnings from individual agricultural commodities 
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exported to Kenya was estimated at $ 1.3 million for maize, $ 1.1 million for beans, and $ 
1.1 million for exports of all industrial products (combined) during the monitoring period. 
 
4.4  Case studies of damping of tobacco products and counterfeit batteries  
 
According to the people interviewed and various sources including media reports, 
smuggling and dumping of cigarettes into Ugandan market is a serious threat to the 
tobacco industry and government revenue, which has caused Government to look for all 
the possible ways of dealing with the problem. Evidence suggests that cigarette brands 
such as Supermatch, Sportsman, Filer Star, Marlborao, Boss, etc., find their way into 
Ugandan market in various quantities illegally, but the most serious problem (authority 
said) is Supermatch.  
Supermatch cigarettes are manufactured by Mastermind Tobacco, owned by a 
Rwandan proprietor (Tribert Rujugiro) with operations in South Africa, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda. The contraband is said to pass 
through Kenya-Uganda border, purportedly destined for neighbouring countries, only to 
be smuggled back into the local market. The selected newspaper articles (excerpts) 
quoted below gives an indication of the trends and momentum that this illegal practice 
has taken. 
 
Smuggled cigarettes impounded 
“Six vehicles loaded with smuggled Super match cigarettes from Kenya have been impounded by the 
Special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) operatives… the vehicles were impounded on their way 
from Malaba and Busia borders where the cartons had been loaded. … about 100 cartons of Super 
Match estimated at Shs 30 million were on board. … the vehicles, mostly saloon cars, have been 
identified as UAD 283W, UAA 367S, UAB 241C, UAD 361T, pick up trucks UAA 3555 and UAY 
291…” 
Monitor, 13 May 2005, p7  
 SPRS impounds cigarettes 
“The special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) on Saturday night impounded 30 cartons of 
contraband Supermatch cigarettes worth sh7.5m. … at Budumba sub-county headquarters in Bunyole, 
Tororo District … (in) Toyota Corolla (Registration) number UAD 375M…” 
 
New Vision, 30 March 2005, p9 by Nathan Etengu 
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URA to destroy 942 cartons of cigarettes 
“The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) will destroy 942.2 cartons of Super-Match cigarettes 
impounded from smugglers by Special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) …” 
 
New Vision, 7 May 2004, p7 by Vision Reporter 
 
SPRS burns contraband cigarettes 
“The special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) yesterday destroyed 942 cartons of assorted cartons 
of contraband cigarettes worth Shs 235.5 million. The … cigarettes included Supermatch, Boss and 
elite Gold brands. … The cigarettes were impounded between 2002-04 from Jinja, Iganga, Mbale, 
Busia and Masaka districts……” 
Monitor, 6 May 2004, p6 by Isaiah Kitimbo 
 
SPRS seize… 
“The special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) on Saturday impounded smuggled Supermatch 
cigarettes valued at over sh7m. …”  
New Vision, 11 April 2005, p4 by Charles Kakamwa 
 
 Frw 14m cigarettes go up in smoke 
“Rwanda Revenue Authorities last week cracked yet another whip against suspected smugglers 
this time by torching Frw 14m (about US$23,728) worth of assorted cigarettes … none had the 
required tax stamps… The cigarette brands included Filer Star, Supermatch, Aspen, Boss, 
Premium, Best, Sportsman, Yes, Marlborao, Lights, Rothmans and SM. Supermatch cigarettes 
are manufactured by Mastermind Tobacco, owned by a Rwandan tycoon, Mr. Tribert Rujugiro 
with operations in South Africa, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda. 
Other brands, such as  Filer, Boss, Premium and Sportsman are also said to have been smuggled 
from Burundi, DRC while others, including Aspen, Yes, Marlboro Lights and Rothmans are 
smuggled from Malaysia… The contraband is said to pass through Rwanda, purportedly destined 
for neighbouring countries, only to be smuggled back into the local market…”  
 
Procurement News, June 28 – July 4 4, 2004, p16 
  
Tobacco firms urge govt to stop smugglers 
“The tobacco industry is pressurizing the government to swiftly stop rampant smuggling along 
the Kenya – Uganda – D.R. Congo border … Representatives from the British American Tobacco 
– Uganda (BATU) and Leaf Tobacco Uganda (LTU) said recently that their efforts to curb 
smuggling in the country had been rendered futile by unchecked flow of contrabands from Kenya 
and the DRC. The Head of Corporate Affairs … said government was still losing Shs 2 billion 
through smuggling. He said Supermatch company of Kenya exports its brand to eastern DRC 
through Uganda. However, some smugglers end up dumping huge quantities of cigarettes in 
Uganda’s market…” 
 
Monitor, 17 September 2004, p20 
SPRS seizes 34 vehicles 
“The Special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) has so far impounded 34 motor vehicles for 
being conveyors of smuggled goods… 1,029 cartons of smuggled contraband cigarettes worth 
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Shs 1.1bn were recently incinerated in Jinja. The cigarettes had a pre taxation value of Shs 350m 
and a tax value of Shs 750m…” 
Monitor, 17 August 2002, p4 
SPRS in another buster 
“Just two days after the Special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) destroyed 1,092 cartons of 
contraband cigarettes, another group of daring smugglers Friday morning fled from the SRPS 
leaving behind more a batch of cigarettes worth over Shs 20m. …SPRS has been monitoring 
ungazzetted landing sites on Lake Victoria that are used for off loading the cigarettes from 
smugglers boats originating from Kenya…” 
New Vision, 12 August 2002, p46 
Sh 1bn impounded cigarettes burnt 
“Contraband cigarettes worth over sh 1bn and five bags of marijuana recently impounded by the 
Special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) and Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) were last 
week incinerated in Jinja… The 1,029 cartons of 32 various cigarettes brands from the USA, 
Pakistan, Europe, Sudan, Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo, were burnt…The smugglers 
used mainly small cars to ferry the cigarettes…” 
New Vision, 13 August 2002, p9 
Security impounds Pakistan cigarettes 
“Security agencies and the Special Revenue Protection Services (SRPS) are holding about 1,200 
carons of cigarettes worth over shs 500m imported from Pakistan. The cigarettes of the Boss 
brand imported by a Ugandan registered company…” 
Newspaper article, unknown/undated source 
 
Concerning dumping of counterfeit batteries we did not find many cases that have been 
pounded except a few examples that are quoted below:  
 
“Two trucks: reg. no. KAN 301V/ZB 6512 and KAN 987K/ZB 5109 that were carrying 2,220 
tons of Tiger Head Batteries (valued at USh 77,583,153) purportedly heading for the DRC was 
found offloading goods in Kampala. Tax revenue of Ush 33,011,631 was recovered, on top of a 
fine of Ush 23,274,946 and another fine of Ush 10,000,000 on the trucks...”   
(Ayoki et al 2005)  
  
In February 2004 an agro company in Kampala imported 4,400 tons of Tiger Head Batteries worth 
US$87,296. The goods were declared as hoes and pangas (agricultural implements are tax exempted 
in Uganda). The goods were detected at the railways goods shade in Kampala… (Ayoki et al 2005).  
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5  Economic impact of illicit trade 
 
This section attempts to give an overview of the impact of illicit trade on the economy in 
terms of revenue, employment, affected sectors, consumers and even prices and the 
overall business environment. However, we shall limit ourselves to giving a general 
perspective on this subject because as stated earlier, the underground nature of illicit trade 
makes assessment of its conformity to relative comparative advantages and effects on the 
country revenue base, price of the affected sectors and employment, particularly difficult.  
It is observed that illicit trade has severe consequences for the country’s social and 
economic development as it denies the country of much needed revenue, and retards the 
growth of private sector and flow of investment through price distortion, among other 
effects. From a BAT Uganda experience alone, government losses about Shs 2 billion per 
annum in taxes due to cigarettes smuggling besides the impact on sales turn over 
experienced by the tobacco company (which itself has effect on government revenue). This 
problem can be attributed in part to the scenario in Figure 11, which illustrates that sales 
(by BAT Uganda) have generally dropped in recent years. 
Figure 11. BAT Uganda: Trends in sales of cigarettes   
Fig 1. BAT Uganda: Trends in sales of cigarettes
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  Source: BAT Uganda 
 
 As estimated by the 1994 and 1998 survey by RTAA, $ 35 million in earnings to illicit 
traders operating between Uganda-Kenya borders, annually. Knowing that such a large 
component of national income is systematically missing in annual estimates in 
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particularly worrying. The ratio of illicit trade to formal trade means that official 
exchanges can be markedly different from those used by the formal traders. 
In 1994, the Standard Newspaper reported that about 25 percent of fuel (petrol, diesel 
and paraffin) consumed in Uganda were smuggled from Kenya, costing the Ugandan 
Government a significant loss in tax revenue of about US$ 1.2 million annually. 
It is well acknowledged that the illicit traders are clearly of sizable numbers, yet not 
included in national statistics – in the employment estimates. Equally important are the 
implications for revenue – in terms of revenue losses arising from the evasion of import 
duty alone for the period were estimated to he potentially as high as $15 million for 
Kenya alone. This is more significant for Uganda with high reliance on import taxes for 
government revenue (28 percent of total tax revenue in 2004). 
The revenue loss to Uganda as a result of illicit trade is perceived to be substantial 
(although no firm figure is given), some rough estimate equates it to over 2 percent of the 
national budget. Combined with fiscal indiscipline, this can lead to a lower quality of 
infrastructure and social services in the short term, and adverse budgetary and monetary 
implications in the long term.  
Moreover, the efforts to build competitive private sector cannot be realised by wide 
spread illicit trade. The existence of illicit trade implies that granting investment 
incentives and removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers may not be sufficient to spur 
private sector investment and intra-regional trade unless illicit are brought under 
‘control’.  
Despite these particular concerns, however, illicit trade has spontaneously been able 
to respond to food shortages across borders. This is because trade in food commodities 
such as beans, rice, maize and fish all stimulated the output of these products by 
providing ready markets for surplus production. This ensured that access to the 
commodities in food deficit areas not only increased but has also stabilised over time.  
Illicit trade has also been able to stabilise seasonal variations in food prices across 
different countries. Among the key drawbacks, illicit trade has on occasion been 
responsible for the transmission of livestock and food pests across borders (UBOS and 
BOU, 2004).   
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6 Legal and regulatory framework for dealing with the illicit trade  
 
This section looks at how Uganda deals with illicit trade; the policies, laws, regulatory 
frameworks and institutions being used to deal with the problem.  
 
2.1 Definition and overview 
According to BAT Uganda, illicit products are goods whose duty has not been (fully) 
paid for in the market where it is being sold; these include smuggled products, duty free 
product beyond allowable limits and counterfeit products. In URA, illicit trade is simply 
referred to as outright smuggling, including goods in excess of allowable limits/quantity 
(duty free limits). Hence, illicit products are goods that have not been declared to customs 
at all. In this context, under-declaration of goods at customs is not considered to be an act 
of smuggling but is generally treated as a customs offence.    
 As such smuggling and under-declaration attract different punitive actions. While 
impounded smuggled goods and the means used to convey them (e.g. vehicles) are 
forfeited to the state, the penalty is less severe for the case of under-declared goods. In 
other words, illicit or illegal trade (as some prefer to call it), includes all trade activities 
carried out with the purpose of evading taxes, gaining ‘abnormal’ profits and taking 
unfair advantage over law-abiding participants in the same industry. These activities take 
the form of smuggling; counterfeiting of products; concealment of information – about 
the quantity, value and even the real name of the product. By definition, illicit trade is not 
included in official national statistics and the national income convention.  
Uganda lacks well-defined policies on illicit trade. For example, in the East African 
Community Customs Management Act, 2004, one of the banned items is counterfeit. Yet, 
the law does not even provide for a definition of counterfeit. In addition to EAC 
instrument, the law dealing with illicit trade is mainly found in the Smuggling Statute of 
1980 and 1987, Foreign Exchange Act, and the Customs and Excise Act. It is also 
contained in the Penal Code.  
In the case of counterfeit, legal enforcement is a big problem as it is upon the holder 
of the copy right or trade mark to prove that his right has been violated; URA can not do 
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much but only able to act on a court order as summarised by the statement in the (URA 
legal counsel’s) recommendation below: 
 
“The onus of proving and enforcement of a trade mark or copy right or any other 
entitlement squarely lies on the holder of that right. Customs ought therefore to 
restrict itself to its statutory duties and can only assist holders in execution of court 
orders” 
 
In the case of smuggling, the significant effort has been the introduce tax stamp on 
cigarettes packets. This implies that any cigarettes package in the market without tax 
stamp is a smuggled one. However, we heard of several examples where smuggled 
cigarettes had tax stamp, which means that tax stamp may not be the most effective way 
of ‘blocking’ smuggling.  
Other common feature that could put the product (for the case of cigarettes for 
example) in suspect is if the package does not bear declaration of source, and/or health 
warning. These too are not deterrent factor, given that this is an organised crime with the 
capacity to operate to the level of sophistication that the task so demand.  
The law though in place, has done little to curb illicit trade activities. The Penal 
Code, like Smuggling Statutes provide for conditions for exportation and importation or 
allowing of goods from or into the country, including licensing and amounts where 
licence may not be required, disclosure or declaration requirements. These pieces of 
legislation were evidently designed on the assumption that people will be honest, and law 
abiding and will obtain license before exporting or importing goods, and will be honest to 
declare goods that are not acquired as gifts items, or for personal use.  
Section 301A(1) states “the exportation and importation of goods from or into 
Uganda is hereby prohibited except under licence granted by the Minister responsible of 
any through such places of exit or entry as may be prescribed from time to time for that 
purpose… Provided that no licence shall be required for the exportation or importation of 
any goods which are: (a) for the personal use of the person exporting or importing them; 
or (b) gift, and are in either case in quantity reasonable for the respective purpose …” 
(Statute 3 of 1980).  
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Section 301B (1) of the Penal Code (Smuggling Statue 5 of 1987) states: “Any 
person who exports or imports any goods from or into Uganda (a) in contravention of 
section 301A; (b) in such manner that the goods are concealed in any way; packed in any 
package (whether or not with other goods) in a manner calculated to deceive any 
authorised officer; contained in any package of which the entry or application for carriage 
out or within Uganda does not correspond with such goods; or in any manner by which 
he evades the control of customs over such exportation or importation … commits the 
offence of smuggling and shall, on conviction, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
not less than three years and not more than fourteen years and shall, in addition, pay a 
fine of not more than five million shillings …” 
The Customs and Excise Act also contains a number of provisions which can be used 
to combat illicit trade activities. Provision is made to deal with incidents of smuggling. 
Persons entering or leaving Uganda are required to declare at the time of entry, all goods 
in their possession which were purchased or acquired outside Uganda, which are 
prohibited, restricted or controlled under any law. On departure, all goods being exported 
must also be declared. Such persons are required to comply with any request or 
instruction of a customs officer and, where necessary to pay the relevant duty. 
Foreign Exchange Act 2004 provides a framework for exchange management and 
how to deal with offences which may be committed in this sector. The Bank of Uganda is 
responsible for the administration of the Act, which puts restriction on carrying on 
foreign exchange business. For example, section 9 (1) states “except with the prior 
permission of the Bank of Uganda, no person shall engage in foreign exchange business. 
Section 17 considers an offence for any person who ‘engages in the business of dealing in 
foreign exchange without a licence issued under section 5; which states “except as 
permitted by any other law, no person shall engage in the business of dealing in foreign 
exchange without a licence issued under this Act”. 
 Under these laws, the Government is obliged to take all necessary measures to 
prevent illicit trade activities, but most of them appear outdated in terms of current 
Ugandan social reality. The law has a lot of loopholes. For instance; ‘personal use’ and 
‘quantity reasonable’ as they apply to cross-border exports and imports can be interpreted 
rather loosely. When the Penal Code and the other laws were passed, illicit trade 
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activities did not have the harmful effect and the magnitude it has today. As such, none of 
the legal instruments addresses the phenomenon to the extent that is required under 
current circumstances.  
 Government has tried to involve other stakeholders in an effort to curb the problem 
of illicit trade. Among these is Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA), and to some 
extent BAT Uganda, augmented by a paramilitary unit: Special Revenue Protection 
Services (SRPS)/ Anti-smuggling Protection Unit to increase surveillances of the border 
areas and seizing suspects. While government motives for this is essentially to protect tax 
revenue, stakeholders feel enforcement related to curbing illicit practices to improve 
welfare of businesses in the country is the primary responsibility of government. 
They feel that government aught to make it as difficult and unprofitable as possible 
for illicit activities and to ensure that those who engage in the same know that is not only 
illegal but extremely risky. Companies that are most affected by this kind of trade 
particularly BAT is interested in giving all the necessary support possible including 
proving information, facilitation, and even reward and recognition for any effort towards 
curbing illicit trade activities.  
Already BAT has instituted an internal anti-illicit trade team, which is charged with 
the responsibility of developing and approving strategy for combating illicit trade. 
Besides, BAT Uganda, URA and Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) have gone ahead to 
hold (regular) cross-border meeting to sensitize enforcement authorities about the 
problem and suggest possible solutions. The last meeting was held in February 2005. 
BAT Uganda has also, apart from facilitating SRPS (to assist them in enforcement), has 
endeavored to coordinate their activities together with its sister company in Kenya (BAT 
Kenya) and Congo (BAT Congo). Through this relationship they have been in position to 
share information and to come up with suggestions on matters of policy concerns. 
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7  Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The necessary pre-conditions for illicit trade in EAC go beyond differences in trade 
policy to include inflation differentials, differences in relative value of the EAC member 
currencies, weak governance and corruption, and investment climate. Hence, measures to 
reduce illicit trade need to be looked at in the broad context of trade policies and 
macroeconomic policy issues and governance.  
Uganda and Kenyan governments have instinctively responded to illicit trade by 
cracking down on the illicit traders as a means of minimising the revenue losses accruing 
from evasion. Eliminating illicit trade will require cross-border concerted effort.  
First, progressive liberalisation and harmonisation of the region’s trade and tax 
policies, greater harmonisation of trade and transit procedures, and a breaking down of 
the bureaucratic obstacles to trade at the border points. The adoption of the customs 
union and free trade areas will inevitably diminish illicit trade and will also lead to lower 
goods and commodity prices in the region in which the trade is currently thriving. 
However, if the bureaucratic obstacles and non-tariff barriers continue to hinder the 
movement of goods across the customs, illicit trade will continue to thrive. 
Second, strengthened coordination with business community and relevant 
stakeholders to design effective policies and programmes to ensure effective 
enforcements including making sure that all consignments transiting through the country 
reach their indicated destinations. In order to avoid product that is in transit through 
Uganda being dumped into the Ugandan market, some stakeholders suggested the 
introduction of transit bonds. For example, all cigarettes through Uganda designated for 
say DR Congo would be required to pay a transit bond at point of entry say Malaba, 
Busia, etc. based on the excise value of the consignment.  The bond would then be 
refunded to the exporter on satisfactory demonstration that the cigarettes have exited the 
country. 
However, URA feels that transit bond, while good, can be bogged down by four 
major implementation challenges. First, it delays the transaction. Second, it is very 
expensive as it would require advance payment of tax equivalent. Third, Uganda is a 
landlocked country, and it would be difficult to enforce.  And fourth, payment procedures 
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are long and cumbersome since payments have to be made through the bank followed by 
process of cross-checking and verification before refunds can be effected. 
Among other suggestions given, participants in the tobacco industry feel it is 
important to make it obligatory for exporter to produce (i) a proof or evidence of demand 
in the destination market, that the exporter/importer is able to trade in the destination 
market; and that the product complies with market legal requirements e.g. health warning 
clauses, tax stamps, tar and nicotine declarations, for sale in (country); (ii) evidence of 
c.i.f exportation to destination market, and a system in place to facilitate reconciliation of 
such exports. Accordingly, fob sales should be discouraged. 
These statutory requirements would be reinforced by enforcing pack and stick 
labelling requirements especially for cigarettes brands commercialised in Kenya; as well 
as improving controls, for instance, discouraging shipments at night or on weekends, and 
increasing penalties for offences.    
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